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WHY HOMELESSNESS? SOME THEORY
I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1980's, a decade of relative prosperity, the
number of people living in the streets, in subway stations,
cardboard boxes, bus terminals, or severely derelict buildings
probably grew substantially in most American cities. The number
of people living in homeless shelters and welfare hotels
definitely skyrocketed. By 1990, one person in 200 in New York
City was living either on the streets or in a shelter, and each
of Manhattan's major transportation terminals had the population
of a medium-sized apartment building, but no apartments.
Why did this happen? In this paper I will try to give an
answer. Essentially, I will show how increases in income
inequality and in real interest rates — two well-documented
phenomena of the '80's — can cause homelessness to rise. In
addition, I will consider how people (altruistic people,
especially) respond to homelessness and show how even optimal
responses can induce greater and more persistent "homelessness"
(in the American sense that includes shelter use) than none at
all.
Why is homelessness so difficult a problem for economic
theory that it requires a whole paper to be written about it?
Subsequent papers will show that in North America the rise in
homelessness has been accompanied by a rise in the rents that
poor people pay, continued abandonment of residential property in
some of the cities where homelessness is most severe (although at
a diminished rate from the '70s), and no strong trends in the
real costs of operating housing. These (stylized) facts are
incompatible with rising homelessness in any standard textbook
model of housing as a single homogeneous commodity (e.g., Mills
and Hamilton [1990], Chapter 10).
For if homelessness resulted from a simple shock that
shifted the demand schedule downward — a poverty shock, for
instance, from falling public assistance levels and deteriorating
labor market rewards at the lower end of the skill distribution -
- then rents should have fallen, not risen. On the other hand, a
gentrification shock that moved the demand curve up could raise
rents and drive poor people out of their homes, but (with
homogeneous housing) could not do so without first causing a
cessation of abandonment. Homelessness, rising rents, and
continuing abandonment are compatible with a supply shock, but
there is no independent evidence that one occurred. (These
arguments are discussed in more detail in O'Flaherty [1991a].)
Explaining these stylized facts requires a more complex model of
the housing market. That is what this paper tries to do.
The paper is severely limited. First, as noted already, it
is primarily theoretical and will not attempt to defend the
stylized facts it will try to explain. Second, since these
stylized facts are generally true only for North American cities,
the model should be thought of primarily as a North American one.
This does not mean that it is totally inapplicable to Europe; but
the problems of data comparability between Europe and North
America are so great that explicit comparisons are best left to
subsequent work ( See O'Flaherty [1991b]). Finally, it will not
address the many other purported explanations of homelessness —
deinstitutionalization, for instance — that have abounded in
both journalistic and scholarly discourse. These, too, will be
left to the future.
What the paper does do is present a coherent partial
equilibrium model that explains not only homelessness, but also
several of the other stylized facts of North Aemrican urban
markets in the 1980's. I don't know any other model that does
this.
The next section is a warm-up; it shows how simple changes
in income distribution without any changes in true prices can
explain some, but not all, of the stylized facts. Section 3 is
the paper's heart, a filtering model that explains most stylized
facts. Sections 4 and 5 examine extensions of the basic model:
section 4 is about rent collection costs, building codes, and
traditional housing programs; and section 5 is about shelters.
Section 6 concludes.
2. SIMPLE CHANGES IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Let there be two qualities of housing, one and two, with two
better than one. Let quality zero correspond to being homeless.
There is a continuum of measure one of consumers, and a
nonhousing good which we use as a numeraire. Each consumer buys
at most one unit of housing, and has the same utility function
u(c[fx) i where q e {0,1,2} denotes the quality of housing (or lack
thereof) she consumes, and x e R+ denotes the amount of the
numeraire good she consumes.
We assume that the utility function has the following
properties:
(u-1) u(.,.) is strictly increasing in both of its arguments
(u-2) for any q, u(q,.) is twice continuously differentiable
and strictly convex downward.
(u-3) for any x, ux(q,x) is nondecreasing in q.
Properties (u-1) and (u-2) are standard; (u-3) essentially
implies a "single-crossing property." It is satisfied, for
instance, if changes in quality always add the same amount to
utility; that is, if utility is additively separable in quality
and nonhousing consumption. Property^ (u-1), though standard, is
not in this context completely innocuous; it implies that
nonhousing consumption has positive marginal utiltity for
homeless people.
Denote
v{q,p,y) =u{q,y-pq) q=e{0,l,2\, ytpq
where pq is the price of one unit of quality q housing.
Clearly, a consumer will choose that housing quality q for which
v(q,p,y) is greatest. Assume p2 > P! >p0 = 0.
Properties (u-1) through (u-3) are sufficient to assure that
higher income consumers never demand lower quality housing.
Specifically, if i > j and





= v{i,p,y) + jy^Piux{i.t')dt'
v{j,p,y) + (y'~Piux{i, t')dt' {by hypothesis)
Jy-p,
v(j.p.y) + P ^ + [ ^ ]
 Ux(i, t')dt' (by(u-2)
J
 y-Pi*\.Pi~Pj]
= v(j,p,y) + ^'Piux{i, t')dt'
J
ux(j, t')dt' (Jby(u-3))
Thus there is an income yh (possibly zero or infinite) such that
v(o,p,y) > v(l,p,y) for all y < yh; and the reverse for y > yh.
Similarly, there is an income ylf that divides incomes y such
that v(l,p,y) > v(2,p,y) from incomes where the reverse holds.
If 0 < yh <Yj, then consumers with income below yh will be
homeless, those with income between yh and y!, will demand low
quality housing, and those with income yh or above will demand
high quality housing. (Consumers with income exactly yh, or
exactly y,, are indifferent between the two relevant qualities of
housing; I will adopt the convention that they choose the higher
quality. Since I always work with atomless income distributions,
this convention will be of no significance). If yh > y,, low
income consumers (those with income below yj will be homeless,
and the rest of the population will demand high quality housing;
no one will demand low quality housing. This could happen if p,
is very close to p2. We will assume, however, that low quality
housing is demanded; so y, > yh.
Let F(.) be the cdf of the income distribution. Then the
proportion of the population homeless is
h = F (yh) ,
the proportion of the population that wants to live in low
quality housing is
J - F{yh) ,
and the proportion that wants to live in high quality housing is
In equilibrium the proportion of people desiring each type of
housing and the proportion living in it must be the same.
To isolate at the simplest level the effect of a change in
income inequality, assume that ipx and p2 are fixed (as they would
be, for instance, if production technology were linear). Then
y,, and yh are fixed also.
To be concrete, so that changes in inequality are well
defined, suppose income is normally distributed. Generalizing
these results will be done shortly. Income is originally
distributed normally with parameters (IJL,O) and the parameters
change to become
(\i, a') , with a'>a .
Let Xj*, and x2* solve
4>(X'||1,O) =<b(X*\VL,O/)
where 0 is the normal pdf, and let xt* < x2*.
As long as less than half the population was originally
homeless, such a change must increase homelessness. The new,
more unequal cdf is above the old cdf everywhere below median
income, and below it everywhere above median income. Hence, if $
is the normal cdf,
h1 = *(y/j»i,o/) >$(yh\\i,o) =h
as long as yh < y. If, in addition, Yi > Y, then the quantity of
high-quality housing must also increase
s'2 = 1 - $ (yjn, a') > 1 -Q(yx\\L,o) = s2
If the homeless and high quality proportions both increase, then
the low quality proportion must decrease: s,' < s,. To rephrase
this result in the words of homeless advocates: "low income
housing will decrease." This testable prediction is reasonably
accurate for the U.S. in the 1980s.
There are several other interesting predictions as well: a
decrease in the proportion of dilapidated housing, and an
increase in average rent. If fires are more likely in low-
quality housing, then fires should decrease when homelessness
rises. These predictions, too, are supported empirically.
The condition yt > /x is sufficient for low quality housing
to decrease, but it is not necessary. Another sufficient
condition is
Xi <L yh < n.
This is because





the expression in square brackets is negative. Hence if
then (Sj'-sJ is negative from the above expression, and if
yx > x2, then yx > x2 >\i
and the first condition holds. In either case, low quality
housing decreases.
Even if both yi < y and yh < x^, it is still possible for low
quality housing to decrease. For if ylt is considerably above
x/, and yh is not too far below it, the decreases in low quality
housing above xt*, will outweigh the increases below it. Thus
while it is not impossible that an increase in income inequality
would increase the quantity of low income housing, many plausible
scenarios can be constructed where rising inequality decreases
the quantity of low income housing.
It is easy to see that the more relaistic case of a
lognormal income distribution presents no real problems: one
need only substitute exp yh and exp y{ for yh and ylr and all the
previous results go through unchanged. The experiment where the
parameters (^,o) change to (/i,a'), however, has to be interpreted
differently. Since the mean of a lognormal distribution is
1exp (\i + -=-1
and the variance is
exp [2\i+2o2] -exp
the experiment is one where both the mean and the variance
increase (but the median and mode stay the same); homelessness
increases and in many cases low quality housing decreases.
In fact, the results can be generalized to an arbitrary
income distribution with cdf F. Let F' differ from F in that





and a unique income
X'(F,F') < fJ(F,F')
such that
f (X*(F,F')) = f(x*(F,F'))
Then homelessness greater under F' than under F as long as




yh > X*{F,F>) ,
low quality housing will decrease under F'.
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While this story is extremely simple and fairly general and
can explain several of the stylized facts, it is not entirely
satisfactory. Two problems stand out. First, the housing market
results are extremely sensitive to the convention one uses to
define "low quality." If in fact the physical world presents us
with a continuum of housing of different qualities, then the
model's predictions about "low quality housing" will not be
robust to changes in the cutoff one uses to distinguish "low
quality" from "high quality". Of course, being robust to changes
in definition is not ususally a desirable characteristic for
theories to have (the theory of gravitation, for instance, should
not continue to hold after the words "up" and "down" are
interchanged). In this case, however, the model also predicts
that for some definitions of "low quality", low quality housing
should have increased. It is an open question whether the data
support this prediction.
Second, the model does not explain why rents as a proportion
of income appear to have risen, especially at the low end of the
income distribution. (Some questions have also been raised about
this particular stylized fact — in particular whether income is
being measured properly — but the existing consensus supports
it, and I will examine it in subsequent work.) In this model,
that cannot happen. Everyone with income in the appropriate
range always buys the same quality of housing, and that quality
of housing always costs the same.
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3. PRODUCTION, FILTERING, AND MANY QUALITIES
To address these difficulties, we need to elaborate on the
production side of the model, and to allow there to be many
qualities of housing — in fact , a continuum . A continuum of
housing qualities is important because some economists — Filer
(1992) most notably — have argued that regulation contributes
significantly to homelessness. In doing so, we need to consider
the possibility of filtering.
Let q e R+ denote the quality of housing. Substitute for
(u-4) for (u-2) and (u-3) :
(u-4) u(.,.) is twice continuously differentiable with
and
Let p(q) be a function giving the price for each quality of
housing. Assume that p(0) = 0 and that p(.) is strictly
increasing. The price function need not be continuous.
Let
| ) = u(q,y-p(q))
denote the semi-direct utility of quality q for a consumer with
income y, and
W{y\p) ={q*\W(q*\pfy) z W(q\p,y) for all q)
denote the demand quality set for income y. It is easy to show
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that under (u-1) and (u-4), if p(.) is linear, semi-direct
utility for every y has a unique maximum and so the demand
quality set exists and is a singleton. Moreover, whether or not
p(.) is linear, whenever semi-direct utility has a unique
interior maximum,
IT (y|p)
is an increasing function of y. Richer people demand higher
quality housing. In general, the demand set for each y will
exist and be unique as long as p"(q) is not tremendously
negative, relative to the second partials of u(.);
ul , .
is the second order condition for the demand set to exist and be
a singleton. Since the LHS is positive this condition will be
met if p" > 0.
A person is homeless if 0 is the only element in her demand
set. Homelessness can occur two different ways. First, if p(.)
is C2 and satifies condition (1) everywhere (so all stationary
points are maxima), then a person will be homeless iff semi-




Since decreases in y increase ux(O,y) (because u M < 0) and
decrease uq(0,y) (because uqx > 0) , if a person with income y is
homeless, everyone with income y1 < y will also be homeless, and
we can specify a unique y as the greatest homeless income.
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Increases in p'(0) will cause increases in yh and homelessness
even if the income distribution is constant.
Second, if p(.) takes a discontinuous jump upward at q = 0,
a person may be better off at q = 0 than at any other quality,
even if semi-direct utility is increasing in the neighborhood of
q = 0. Suppose p(.) is continuous except at zero, and let
W{q\p,y). (2)
A person will be homeless if
u(0.y) > W**(y\p) .
Let q* denote the positive value of q that maximizes semi-direct
utility in (2). Then
- ^ * ux{q\y-p{q*)) zux(q\y) -ux(0,y) + fJ°uX(J(q,y) dq * ux(0,y) = 3u(g > y ) •
So once again, if a person with income y is homeless, so too will
everyone with income y' < y be homeless.
On the production side, the essential idea is that every
quality of housing produced will be produced at the lowest
possible supply price. Housing of a given quality can be
produced either by direct construction or by filtering, and once
produced can be either maintained or not.
Let c(q) be the construction cost schedule: it costs c(q)
to construct a unit of quality q housing. I assume that unit
cost is independent of the number of units being constructed.
Assume
(c - 1) c is twice continuously differentiable on R++ with
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c' > 0 and c" > 0.
(c-2) c(0) = 0, and
(c - 3) c(q) > 0 for all q > 0.
(c-1) and (c-2) are largely standard, but notice that (c-1) does
not preclude a positive jump at q = 0.
Maintenance works in the following fashion: if m > 0 is
being spent per unit time on maintenance, quality stays constant;
if nothing is being spent on maintenance, quality deteriorates at
the rate of one unit per unit time; and if m' < m is being spent,
quality deteriorates at the rate of (1 - m'/m) per unit time.
Arnott, Davidson, and Pines [1983] have rightly criticized
Henderson [1977] for using such a specification of maintenance
because it is a special case, but we are more interested here in
tractability than generality. Notice that maintenance here is
entirely forward-looking: rent can still be collected even if no
money is being put into the current operation of the unit. We
will also relax this assumption shortly.
Consider a steady-state equilibrium with perfect
competition, free exit and entry, and no taxes or regulations.
There are two different kinds of steady-state equilibria.
In one kind, construction is expensive relative to maintenance,
and houses are maintained forever. We call this the cheap
maintenance case. In the other kind of equilibrium, maintenance
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maintenance case. In the other kind of equilibrium, maintenance
is expensive relative to construction, and some houses are
eventually abandoned. We call this the cheap construction case.
To determine which case applies, we need some notation. Let
p (q) = c (q) - mq
and let
q* = argmin p (g)
By (c-l) q* is unique. Then, we will see, equilibrium will be of
the cheap maintenance variety iff p(q*) > 0 and q* >0; it will be
of the cheap construction variety iff p(q*) < 0. (The case q* =
0 is essentially the same as the cheap maintenance case as is the
case /o(q*)=O; the case where q* does not exist is essentially
the same as cheap construction case. For brevity I will ignore
these three cases.) Thus, which case applies is independent of
the rate of interest or the distribution of income or demand; it
depends only on the construction cost schedule and the cost of
maintenance.
In both cases, houses of sufficiently high quality are
treated the same way: they are constructed at that quality and
maintained. Let r denote the (real) rate of interest. Then:
Proposition 1
If q > q* and housing of quality q is consumed, then
p(q) = rc(q) + m
in any steady-state equilibrium, and all houses for which q> q*
are maintained in a steady state equilibrium.
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Proof
Let v(q) denote the value of a house of quality q. In
equilibrium, v(q) < c(q), for all q, or construction would be
unbounded. On the other hand, if demand for quality q is
positive, then v(q') = c(q') for some q' > q; otherwise there
would be no supply at q.
Suppose the hypothesized price schedule prevails. I will
show this to be an equilibrium. First, given this schedule,
maintenance is the optimal policy for an owner. Maintaining
gives a value at q of
pig) -m _ rc(q) +m-m _ , »
Alternatively, suppose the owner lets the house deteriorate for
the next instant dt. This saves the owner mdt in maintenance
costs but reduces the value of the house by c'(q)dt. Since q >
q* implies c'(q) > m, letting the house deteriorate is not an
optimal policy.
Since v(q) = c(q), supply can accommodate any pattern of
demand. Hence the price schedule is an equilibrium.
To show that no other price schedule is an equilibrium,
suppose some other price schedule prevails and demand is positive
at q > q*. Then for some q' > q, v(q') = c(q') and it must be
optimal for the owner at q' to let the property deteriorate to q.
In particular the owner at q' must be able to do at least as well
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by letting the property deteriorate to q as by maintaining it at
q'. The value of letting the property deteriorate is
J q
where p(.) is some alternative price schedule. But suppose that
for some
qe[q,q/]
p(q) > rc (g) +m
Then
<3 * > c(q)
and so a house could be built at q and maintained forever at
positive profit. The constraint
v(q) 4 c(q)
would be violated. Hence




D<. f q'p(q) e-r{*'-&dq+ e-^v'-vc(q) ,
J q
which is the value of letting the house deteriorate from q' to q
when the equilibrium price schedule prevails. Since maintaining
at q' under the equilibrium price schedule was strictly better
than letting the house deteriorate,




D < c(q') = v(q').
So it is not optimal to let the house deteriorate to q. Hence
supply at q is zero, and there is no equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
The cheap construction and cheap maintenance cases differ
for q < q*. We will consider each case in turn. We will assume,
to make things interesting, that if p(q) = rc(q) +m for all q,
demand for some q < q* is positive.
Cheap maintenance
For q < q*, the equilibrium price schedule in the cheap
maintenance case is simply a straight line from p(q*) with a
slope of (-rm). Any price line with this slope has an important
property: if you start at any point on such a price line, value
will be the same no matter whether you maintain the house at that
quality forever, or let the house deteriorate to any lower
quality and maintain it at that lower quality forever. This
property will be useful at several points, and we will state it
as a lemma:
Lemma 1: Suppose p(q') = p(q) - rm(q-q') for all 0<q'<q.
Then
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for all q' < q.
Proof:
f"p(t) e"r(^e) dt=p(g) f "e-^Wdt-rmf Q(q-t)
Jql Jq' Jq'
= p(q) -m _ e-r(q-q>) p(q') -
r r
from which the lemma follows.
Q.E.D.
Define the maintenance-case price schedule pm as:
pm(q) =rp(g*) + m + rmq qe(o,q*)
The basic result of this section is
Proposition 2: In the cheap maintenance case, the
maintenance case price schedule is an equilibrium price schedule
In the steady state equilibrium with this price schdule
v(q) =p(g') + mq q£(o,q*)
No construction occurs below q*, and all qualities that are
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supplied are maintained, but the lowest quality units are neither
supplied nor demanded.
Proof: First, we show that maintenance is an optimal
policy for any owner. It is easy to see that for an owner who
maintains forever value is
p(q)-m= rp(g') +m + rmg-m = p ( < r ) + mq §
as stated. This value is always strictly positive whenever p(q*)
> 0.
Suppose instead that the house is allowed to deteriorate.
If the house deteriorates to any positive quality and then is
maintained forever, lemma 1 shows that value is not increased
over value without any deterioration. The only alternative
policy that might be more profitable than eternal maintenance is
to allow the house to deteriorate completely to zero, and never
maintain it. We call this policy abandonment from q. Such a




lemma 1 shows that abandonment is strictly less profitable than a
policy that always maintains at some sufficiently low quality
e > 0.
Thus, since a policy that maintains at e has the same value as a
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policy that maintains at q, maintenance at q is strictly better
than abandonment from q. So maintenance is always an optimal
policy.
Next, observe that v(q) < c(q) for all q < q*, and v(q) <
c(q) for all q< q*. This is because
v(q) = p(g*) + mq=c(q*) -m(q-q*) ± c(q') - f *V( t) dt = c(g)
since c'(t) < m for
t e kq.q*) .
Thus no construction will take place at qualities below q*.
Since v(q*) = c(q*), an indefinite number of houses can be
produced at q*f and since allowing deterioration to any positive
quality is no worse than maintaining, any quantity (including
zero) can be supplied at any quality. Hence supply can
accommodate any pattern of demand, and pm is an equilibrium price
schedule.
Since
gio P m ( & = rp(q*) +m> m> 0,
demand will be zero for some qualities in the neighborhood of
zero, and so supply will be zero there too. Let q denote the
lowest quality of housing for which demand is positive. Owners
of quality q houses are indifferent between maintaining and
allowing to deteriorate, and so since no one demands housing of
lower quality than q, they maintain. It follows that in steady
state equilibrium houses at all qualities above q are also
maintained; there is neither filtering nor construction.
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Q.E.D.
The maintenance-case price schedule is not a unique
equilibrium, simply because for qualities below q, small
deviations in price will affect nothing. We can show, however,
that no other equilibrium price schedule has different prices at
qualities that are observed in the market.
Propositions: Let p(.) be an equilibrium price schedule in
the cheap maintenance case, and let demand and supply be positive
at q < q*. Then
p(q) = pm(q) .
(3) Proof: From Proposition 1,
p(q') = pm(q*) = zc(q*) + m.
Next, I will show that if no deviations from pm(.) have
occurred in the interval [q,q*], p(q) = pm(q) . From this
"induction step" and (3) will follow the proposition.
Suppose p(q) > pm(q)• Then from lemma 1 infinite profit
could be made by building houses at q*, letting them deteriorate
to q, and maintaining them there forever. If p(q) < pm(q) , then
no houses will be supplied because both filtering (from lemma 1)
and construction are unprofitable. Hence p(q) = pm(q) and the
"induction step" is complete.
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Q.E.D.
Notice that the cheap maintenance case is marked by two
discontinuities. Since for
<je [0,g*] , v{q) < c(q) ,
c(q) must approach a positive number as q approaches zero. Since
c(0) = 0 by (c.2) — homelessness is free — the cheap
maintenance case is possible only if the construction cost
schedule is discontinuous at zero. This possibility does not
seem deeply offensive to physical reality. Because c(0) = 0
implies p(0) = o, the price schedule must also be discontinuous
at zero.
This price schedule discontinuity means homelessness of the
second variety will occur in the cheap maintenance case. No one
will want to live in e quality housing, since e quality housing
is only vanishingly better than homelessness, but costs a non-
vanishing amount more. In this equilibrium, certain low
qualities of housing disappear from the market while people are
homeless, but government interference is not the culprit.
In steady state equilibrium with cheap maintenance, prices
are completely determined by supply-side considerations. Changes
in income distribution cannot affect the price schedule or yh.
Increasing inequality raises homelessness by increasing
population below yh, but for no other reason. The relationship
between income and price or quality does not change.
On the other hand, suppose that the interest rate rises.
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All prices for positive qualities increase, since
for all q >0. This general price increase moves the semi-direct
utility function down for every income and every positive quality
of housing. At the old yh/ and minimum observed quality q,
housing is now worse than homelessness. Homelessness increases,
and the old bottom of the housing quality distribution
disappears. This loss of the lowest quality housing is
consistent with the observed decrease in dipalidation and in
fires.
An increase in the interest rates raises the average rent of
some aggregate called "low-income housing" in two ways.
First, composition changes because the lowest qualities of
housing disappear. Second, price for each remaining quality
increases. If "low-income housing" is defined as housing
occupied by people with income below some threshold y, these
changes will be partially offset by a reduction in the quality
demanded by everyone who remains housed.
"Low-income housing," however, usually gets defined
operationally as housing with a price below some price pL — say,
$250 a month (see, e.g., Mihaly [1991]). An interest rate
increase lowers the stock of such housing in two ways: first, at
the bottom, by making some very low quality housing units
disappear; and second, at the top, by pushing the price p(q) of
some housing qualities above pL and thus making these qualities
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disappear from the measured count of "low-income" units as well.
These two changes, however, may be partially offset by a
third effect, an increase in the population inhabiting the
relevant quality interval. Consider a quality interval [q!,q2]/
h^ < 3i < cb« I n t n e original equilibrium it was occupied by all
households in the income intervals [y1#y2]. Let [y/ ,y2'] denote
the income interval that corresponds to this quality interval in
the new equilibrium with a higher interest rate. The population
demanding housing in the quality interval will increase if two
not especially restrictive conditions are met.
(i) Y\' " y2' ^ Yi ~ Yi, and
(ii) the density of income is rising in the relevant
neighborhood.
Condition (ii) is likely to be satisfied in discussions of
low-income housing because all the relevant incomes are below the
mode of a unimodal income distribution. Condition (i) is more
problematic because it depends on the exact form of the utility
function, although many common utlity functions (including the
semilogarithmic function we use as our standing example for the
cheap construction case) satisfy this condition.
The cheap maintenance case thus exhibits many features of
the 80's housing market, especially for cities like Toronto and
London where abandonment and demolition have been negligible.
For a model with the abandonment and demolition characteristic
of northeastern and midwestern American cities, we must turn to
the cheap construction case.
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Cheap construction
In the cheap construction case, p(q') < 0. This case is
more difficult than the cheap maintenance case. I do not have a
complete general solution. In this section, I will begin by
outlining the most general properties a solution must have, and
the derive incresingly specific results under increasingly
restrictive assumptions. Throughout, I will assume
P-l The support of the income distribution is connected.
P-2 The support of the income distribution includes zero.
To summarize the results of this section: the equilibrium
features a bifurcation. Above some quality q2 > q*, houses are
always maintained. Below some quality q1 < q*, they are never
maintained. Between qx and q2 there is neither demand nor supply.
Houses are continuously being constructed at qt; these houses
deteriorate until they fall to quality zero and are abandoned.
Homelessness is of the first type.
This equilibrium will be described in more detail in a
series of propositions. First, notice that the maintenance-case
price schedule cannot be an equilibrium in the cheap construction
case. This is because with the maintenance-case price schedule
and p(q*) < 0 the value of letting a house deteriorate to zero
is always greater than the value of maintaining it. Since the
value of maintaining a house at q* is c(q*) under the maintenance-
case price schedule, the value of letting a house deteriorate
from q* is greater than the cost of building it. Such a
condition cannot obtain at equilibrium.
27
Proposition 4. If p(q*) < 0,
for any q e (q*, 0) , where b is the highest quality at which pm
is zero, or zero, whichever is greater.
Proof: If p(q*) < 0,
pa(0) = rp(g*) +m < m
so that for some s > 0, pm(s) = m and so the value of maintaining




However, the value of letting a property deteriorate until either
its price or its quality is zero is positive. So a policy of
letting a house deteriorate until it is worthless is more
profitable than a policy of letting it deteriorate to s and
maintaining it there forever. But by lemma 1, the latter policy
has the same value as a policy of maintaining the house at q
forever.
Q.E.D.
Corollary: If p(q*) < 0,
p W ~m > c(g')
and so the maintenance-case price schedule is not an equilibrium.
Intuitively, maintenance-case prices are too high to be used
in the cheap construction case. It should not be surprising then
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that the first deviation from the maintenance-case price schedule
must be below it. Let p(.) denote a cheap construction
equilibrium price schedule.
Proposition 5: It is never the case that for some 5 > 0 and
all e satisfying 0 < e < 8,
p(q'-e) > pa(q*-e) .
Proof: Suppose not. Then by lemma 1 building a house at
q*, letting it deteriorate to q* - 6 and maintaining it there
forever will give strictly greater value than maintaining it at
q* forever. Since maintaining it at q* forever gives a value of
c(q*) , this means that the policy of deterioration to (q* - <S)
will earn strictly positive profit. Strictly positive profit
cannot occur in equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
So the first deviation (starting from q* and working down)
from the maintenance-case price schedule has to be below it.
Houses of qualities on this first deviation, if they are supplied
at all, cannot be maintained.
Proposition 6: If p(q) < pm(q) and p(q') < pm(q') for all
q' e [q,q*], the houses of quality q are either not supplied or
not maintained.




 < p*(q)-m = c(g.} _ {q..q)m<c{g) ,




they would not be supplied through construction at q* and
deterioration to q, either.
Q.E.D.
Next we will show that the equilibrium will bifurcate: no
houses will be supplied or demanded at the top of the first
deviation (again, starting from q* and working down) from the
maintenance-case price schedule. Let q** denote the supremum of
qualities with prices below pm on the first deviation; that is,
for all qualities q' > q", pm(q') = p(q')r and q** is the infimum
of qualities with this property. We will show that p(.) is
continuous at q**, that the left-hand derivative of p(.) at q** is
greater than rm and so p'(.) is discontinuous at q**, and that
this discontinuity will eliminate demand for qualities in some
neighborhood below q**. We will state two lemmas before proving
the main proposition.
Lemma 2: p(.) is continuous at q", if qualities of the
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neighborhood quality q** housing are observed in the market.
Proof: Suppose not. Then
lim . .. m / » v lim ...
t[q*. Pit) = pm(q) > t| „ pit),
since the first deviation is below the maintenance-case price
schedule. Then no houses will be supplied on the lower portion,
or demanded on the upper portion, of some neighborhood of q**. In
particular, either supply or demand will be zero at q, depending
on which limit is actually achieved.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 3: If qualities in the neighborhood of quality q"
housing are observed in the market, p'(.) is not continuous at q,
and
lim //^ .x . lim /, ..
fcT „ p'(fc) > tl „ p'(t) =rm.
Proof: Clearly
otherwise the first deviation would not be below the maintenance-




as P' (q**) .
Since by proposition 6, houses of qualities slightly below
q** are not maintained, we can write the value of a house of
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quality t slightly below q** as
v(t) =ft p(s)e-rlt-s)ds + e-r[t-«*"-x)] v(q"-x),
where x is some positive number.
Then
v'(t) = p(t) -rv(t)
v " (t) = p' (t) -rv' (t)
v"'(t) = p"(t) - rv" (t) .
As t approaches q, p(t) approaches pm(q"), by lemma 2, v(t)
approaches v(q**) , and p' (t) approaches P' (q") . So v' (t)
approaches
rv(q") + m - rv(q") = m,
and v''(t) approaches
P'(q") - rm.
Suppose P'(q**)=rm. Then v'' (t) approaches zero, and V '' (t)
approaches
which we denote P" (q**) . Suppose P'' (q") > 0. Then for t
slightly smaller than q**, p' (t) < rm, and q** is not the beginning
of a downward deviation from the maintenance-case price schedule.
Suppose P"(q") < 0. Then v"' (t) < 0, V ' (t) = 0, as t
approaches q**, and so for t slightly less than q**, v'' (t) > 0,
and thus V(t) < m. But then value at t is greater than
maintenance-case value at t (since in the maintenance-case value
declines at rate m) and so by lemma 1 positive profit could be
made by building a house at q*, letting it deteriorate to t, and
3 2
then trading for v(t).
Then suppose P''(q**) = 0. The same analysis can be repeated
until at some level n P(n)(q") ^ 0. Since q** starts a deviation
from the maintenance-case price schedule, for which all higher
derivatives vanish, surely such an n exists.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 7: No houses of qualities in some neighborhood
of q" are observed in the market in equilibrium.
Proof: Proof is by contradiction.
Suppose such qualities are observed in the market. Then at
q" p(.) is continuous (by lemma 2) and p'(.) discontinuous (by
lemma 3). Consider semi-direct utitlity
W(q"|p,y) = u(q', y-p(q"))
and its derivative
W'(q"|p,y) = uq - Ud?'(q").
Since p'(.) jumps down at q**, W'(.) must also jump up at q**, for
all y. From the population assumptions, there must be some
consumers for whom W'(.) crosses zero twice; for these consumers
w(*iP/v) must have two local maxima, one above and one below q**.
Consider a consumer for whom W(t|p,y) = 0 for some t very
slightly below q". Only such a consumer might possibly purchase
t housing, since only local maxima are global maxima.
But for t sufficiently close to q" such a local maximum
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could not be global. W(.) will decline only a little bit before
q is reached, and then it will increase for a finite stretch
before the second local maximum is achieved. Since for t
sufficiently close to q** the decline is arbitrarily small, the
local maximum above q** must make semi-direct utility greater than
the local maximum below q". Hence, there will be no demand for
qualities slightly below q. A similar argument establishes the
same result for qualities slightly above q".
Since the assumption that all qualities in all small
neighborhoods of q** are observed in the market leads to the
conclusion that demand vanishes in some neighborhood of q", we
have established a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
So in a steady state houses below q** cannot be supplied by
filtering from above q**. We will argue that houses below q** will
have to be supplied by constuction below q**. Let qlt denote the
highest quality less than q** of a house that appears on the
market. Then we will show that pfq^ < pm(qt) , and so if a house
were built at q1# it would not be maintained. To do so, we will
again use two lemmas.
Lemma 4: Let q2 denote the lowest quality above q" that
appears on the market, and let y denote the income of the




W(qi|p,y) < W(q2|P/y) .
Then consumers of income y would not buy qx housing, contrary to
supposition.
Suppose
W(qi|pfy) > W(q2|p,y) .
Then for some e sufficiently small, consumers of income (y + e)
will have a local maximum at q',
q, < q' < q",
and will strictly prefer this local maximum to the local maximum
above q**. Then qt would not be the highest quality less than q**
to appear on the market. Another contradiction.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 5: Let z(q|x,y') be the indifference curve through
point x, in (q,p)-space for consumers with income y'. That is, a
consumer with income y' is indifferent among all quality-price
combinations (q, z(q|.)). Then z''(q|x,y') < 0.
Proof: This follows by simple algebra from u-4, the
diminishing marginal rate of substitution between housing and
other consumption.
Proposition 8: p(qx) < pm(qi) .
Proof: At q2, the indifference curve z (q| (q2,pm(q2) ) ,y) is
tangent to the maintenance-case price schedule (understanding the
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price schedule p(q) = rc(q) +m for q > q* to be part of the
maintenance-case schedule) . Then at q2, (pm) ' (q2) = z' (q2| .) .






Pm(qi) > z(qi|(q2/pm(q2)) ,y) =p(q t),
where the last equality follows from lemma 4.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 9: If houses are constructed at qlf they are not
maintained.
Proof: Suppose a house were constructed and maintained at
q,. Its value would be
P(g,)-m< P ' W -
where the first inequality follows from proposition 8, and the
second inequality from proposition 2. Hence if a house is to be
constructed at qj its value must be greater than the value that
it would have if it were maintained forever.
Q.E.D.
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For future reference, we also have
Proposition 10: p' (qt) > rm.
Proof; From lemma 5
z'(qil(q2r pm(q2))/y) > z'(q2i(q2, pm(q2)/y) ^
where the first inequality holds because qt < q2, and the second
because the local optimality of q2 implies that the indifference
curve must be tangent to the price schedule there. Similarly,
the local optimality of qx implies that the indifference curve
must be tangent to the price schedule there also,
z'(q,i.) = P'(q,)
and the proposition follows.
Q.E.D.
Since demand is zero between q! and q2, by the arguments of
proposition 6 no houses will be supplied by filtering to quality
qt. Hence any houses supplied to qt must be supplied by
construction.
Since houses will be constructed and not maintained at qt,
it becomes important to study the steady-state properties of
systems where houses are not maintained. Four results are
relevant.
Proposition 11: In a steady state equilibrium no houses
are maintained at any quality q' < qx.
Proof: Suppose houses were maintained at quality q'< qt.
Then over time the number of houses of quality q' would be
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increasing. This would not be a steady state
Proposition 12:
tiO
Proof: If no maintenance is being applied, houses will be
supplied at all qualities down to zero. So demand must be
positive at all qualities down to zero. Let e approach zero. If
p(e) > 0, as in the cheap maintenance case, then for sufficiently
small qualities demand is zero. If p(q') = 0 for some q' > 0,
then there would be no demand for any quality less than q'.
Hence the price schedule must be continuous and upward sloping at
zero.
Q.E.D.
So homelessness will be ofche first variety, with semi-
direct utility continuous but downward-sloping at zero.
Proposition 13: Let s(q',r) denote the supply of quality
q' housing at time T. In steady-state equilibrium, for all T,
s(q',r) is constant in q' for q' e (O,qj) .
Proof: Consider (q',q") both in ( 0 ^ ) and set
A = q"-^ > 0
by construction. From no-maintenance (proposition 11),
s(q",x) =s(q/,x+A)
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From the definition of a steady state.
s(q't x) = s{q', T + A) .
Hence
s(q',x) = s(g",x),
and these quantities have to be the same over time in the steady
state.
Q.E.D.
If supply is constant with respect to quality, demand has to
be constant too. Recall that F(.) is the cdf of the income
distribution. Assume p(.) is chosen so that W*(yjp) , the demand
set correspondence, is invertible, and let Y(.) denote its
inverse. Specifically:
Y(q') = {y|W(y|p) = q'}
the set of incomes whose recipients demand quality q' houses. If
p(.) is continuous and differentiable, Y(q') is a function of
p(q') and p'(q'). Then if demand is constant over some range,
F(Y(q')), considered as a function of q' has to increase at a
constant rate. Thus




in steady state equilibrium, if all construction in this interval
is at qx. If building occurs at q < qlt then (4) holds for any
interval without building.
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Given the income distribution, and assuming no building
below q w (4) is a third-order differential equation in p(.)/
since Y(q') depends on both p(q') and p'(q'). Proposition 12
supplies one initial condition, but two initial conditions remain
to be specified.
These conditions arise from consideration of q^ The first
is obvious: value has to equal construction cost.
Proposition 15:
x) = fjlp(t) e'*^-" dt = c(qx) .
The next condition is about the price at qt:
Proposition 16: p(qO = rcfqj + c'(q^ .
Proof: Suppose p(qt) > r c ^ ) + c' (qx) . Increasing
quality slightly increases construction cost by c'(qj . It
increases value by p(qi) - rv(qt) = p(qt) - rcfqj), by
proposition 15. Since pCqJ > r c ^ ) + c'(qj ,
P(qi) - r c ^ ) > [rctqO + c' (q2) ] - rc(qx) = C (q,) .
The increase in value is greater than cost, and so construction
would occur at qualities higher than qlf contrary to hypothesis.
(Equivalently, new houses could be built at slightly higher
quality than qlf and priced at less than qu but more than
rc(c[i) + c' (Qi) • These houses would be profitable to their
builders, given the price schedule at and below q w and would
take all demand from qx.)
Similarly, if pfqj < rc(q1) + C (q{) , building a house of
slightly lower quality would be more profitable than building a
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house of qlt quality, and such lower quality houses could either
make positive profits or undercut the price schedule.
Hence p(qt) = rc(q,) + C (q,) , as the only remaining
alternative.
Q.E.D.
From the definition of q*,
rc{q) + c'(q) £ rc{q) +m as
From (c-1), the function re + c' is increasing and concave
upward. At q*# its slope is greater than rm. For brevity we
will write
R(q) = rc(q) + C ( q ) .
These properties of the R(.) function will suffice to show that
qj and q2 bracket q*. As usual, we use three lemmas.
Lemma 6: If R(q2) < z (qtj (q2,pm(q2) ) ,Y) then for all
q e [qw q2]/ R(q) < z(q| (q2,pm(q2)) *y) •
Proof: Let




X"(q) = z"(q|.) - R"(q) < 0 for all q since z" < 0 and
R" > 0. Hence if there is a stationary point for X between q!
and q2 it is a maximum; so
X(q) > 0 for q e [qlf q2] .
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Q.E.D.
Lemma 7: If p(q) > R(q) for all q e [qlf q2] , with some
strict inequality, then positive profit can be made by building
houses at q2 and letting them deteriorate to qlr and then to zero
Proof: Note that
RiVe-*1*-* dt = c(q2) -
since R(t) is the price that keeps value, i.e.
f *p(t)e"r(*-« dt,
Jo
rising at the same rate as construction cost. If p(t) > R(t)
for all t, with some strict inequality
)dt>c(g2)-e-r(*-*)c(g1) =c(g2) - v(gx) e""*"** .
But
f*p(t) e-r(^c) dt = v[q2) - viqj
and so
v(q2) > c(q2) .
Q.E.D.
Lemma 8: pm(q2) < R(q2) .
Proof: Suppose not. Then R(q2) < z (q2| (q2,pm(q2) ) ,y) ,
since pm(q2) = z (q2j (q2/pm(q2) ) ,y) . From lemma 6,
R(q) < z(q| (q2/pm(q2)) ,y) for all q e [qw q2] with strict
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inequality at q2. Since p(q) > z(q| ) for q e [q17 q2] ,
P(q) ^ R(q) for all q e [q,, q2] with strict inequality for
some q. By lemma 7, v(q2) > c(q2), which is impossible in
equilibrium. A contradiction.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 17: q2 > q*.
Proof: From lemma 8, q2 must lie in a region where
pm(.) < R(.). One such region is the region q > q*; there may
be another such region, where q < q* and pm(q) = rp (q*)+m+rmq.
This region, called the lower region, is separated from q*, since
R(.) < pm(.) in the immediate neighborhood below q*.
We will show that q2 cannot lie in the lower region.
Suppose q2 lies in the lower region. In the lower region
R'(.) < rm, and so q! < q2 lies in the lower region, too. Then
R(cii) = P(<3i) > Pm(c3i) / which contradicts proposition 8. Hence
q2 does not lie in the lower region.
Q.E.D.
Since q! < q*, q* lies in the gap [qt/ q2) . While the price-
schedule in the gap is of course not determined uniquely, we can
summarize the results so far:
Proposition 18: For some qlr an equilibrium price
schedule must be of the form
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p(q) = Pm(q) q > q*
= R(q) q < q* < qt
= g(q) q < qi
provided no construction takes place below q1# where g(q) solves
third order differential equation (4) , subject to the conditions
in propositions 8, 15 and 16. No houses of qualities between q:
and q2 appear in the market, where q2 > q*. For qualities greater
than q2 or less than qlf no other equilibrium schedule exists.
Proposition 18 describes what an equilibrium must look like
if it exists, but doesn't say whether one exists. Three kinds of
problems might arise:
(a) it might be optimal for owners to maintain along the
price-schedule that satisfies differential equation (4);
(b) qj and q2 with the appropriate properties might not
exist; or
(c) it might be optimal to build at qualities below q^
Problem (c) is not so serious a problem as the other two; if it
were to happen there still might be an equilibrium, but it would
be different below q^ Problems (a) and (b) would be fatal. A
fairly standard fixed point argument can be used to rule out
problem (b) in general; I will omit it for the sake of brevity.
Sufficient (far from necessary) conditions for avoiding (a) and
(c) can also be found; we will give two such conditions below and
then turn to an example that will be used for comparative
dynamics purposes.
Proposition 19: Let p(.) be,a solution to (4) satisfying
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the three initial conditions. If either p"(q) > 0 or p"(q) < 0
for all q e [0, qj, then it is never optimal on this interval
for an owner to maintain a house.




is greater than the value of letting the house deteriorate until
it is abandoned,
Wg) = f <5rp(t)e-r(<?-t) dc.
Jo
So maintenance is optimal iff
p(g) - rv(q) > m.
Denote
x(q) =p(q) - rv(q) =v'{q) .
Then x(0) = 0 < m, and
x{qx) = idqj +c'(q1) - ic(qx) =c'(q1) < m,
and
x'iq) = v"(q)
x"{q) =p"{q) -iv"(q) =p/f(q) - ix1' (q) .
Thus it would be possible for x(q) > m for some q only if x(.)
had an interior maximum on [0,q|]. Let q' be such an interior
maximum. Then x'(q') = 0 and x"(q') = p"(q')- S o if
p"(.) > 0, no interior maximum exists and maintenance is never
optimal.
Suppose p"(.) < 0. Let
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denote the value of maintenance. Clearly, v(q) > v^q) if
p(q)<m, and so suppose p(q)>m. Let A (p) denote the quality-
decrease needed to bring a line with slope (-rm) down from p to
m:
A(p) = JL(p-m) = ±vm.
rm m
From lemma 1
vm(q) = f* [p(q) -rm(q-t)]e-r{<*-c) dfc + ^ ^
J A ( ( ) )
= f* ipig) -rm(q-t)]e-r{tJ-t) dt.
Write
D(q) = v(q) - v
We need to show that D(.) is nonnegative on [ 0 ^ ] . Clearly
D(0) > 0, and D(q{) > 0, and D(.) is continuous. Rewrite D(.)
Dig) = ["pitfe-*1*-*) -fq [p{q)-im{q-t)]e-r^-t) dt
Jo Jqr-A(p(g))
[pit) -p(q) +rm(q-t)] e-^w + {*' pit) e~r^-t]dt
q(p(q)) Jo
Then,
/• a «=~^A (P(Q) )
D'iq) = - / [p'tO-rmle-***-**-- [p'(g-A (pig) ) -rm] -rDiq)
JA(()) r
From proposition 10, p' (qj > rm, and so since p" < 0,
P' (<3) > P' (Qi) > rm for q < qt. Hence the first two terms of
D'(.) are always negative.
Suppose D(q') < 0 for some q^ < q^ Since DCqJ is
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strictly positive and D(.) is continuous, somewhere between q'
and q1# D must be both strictly positive and increasing. But
since the first two terms of D'(.) are always negative, this is
impossible. Hence D(q) > 0 for all q e [0, qj .
Q.E.D.
Next is a simple necessary condition for building not to be
optimal below q:
Proposition 20: If the lines R(.) and p(.) intersect
once on the interval (0,q) and either c'(q) or c(q) approaches a
positive number as q -• 0, then building is optimal nowhere in
this interval.
Proof: Since the two lines intersect once at q', say, and
p(0) = 0, p(.) must be above R(.) for q > q' and below R for
q < q' . Let
C = l i m clt)
° t-0 '
Then
6(g) =c(q)-v(q) = Co+[ " R(t) e'*1*-* dt - f 9 pit) e-*{«~t) dt
Jo Jo
Since c(qj) = v(qj) by proposition 15,
Co = (* [p(t)-R(t)]e-r{<*-t) dt,Jo
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and so
fi(<ar> = f* [p(t)-R(t)]e-zl*-* dt
Jq
Since p(t) > R(t) for q > q', S (q) > 0 for q > q'
Since p(t) < R(t) for q < q', S'(q) > 0 for q < q',
and since 5 (0) > 0, 5 (q) > 0.
Q . E . D .
An example will show that it is possible for the conditions
for proposition 19 to be met, and make it easier to do
comparative dynamics exerices.
Suppose
u(q,x) = In x + q
and income is distributed uniformly over some sufficiently large
interval. Then
Y(q) = P(q) + p'(q)
and
p(q) = Dq - Ml-e*)
solves differential equation (4) with p(0) = 0 . D and K{ can be
derived from the value-matching conditions. Since p" (q) = Kje"*1,
pM(.) never changes signs. It is easy to verify that condition
(1) is satisfied even if p" < 0.
The highest income of a homeless person in the example is
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Y(0) = p'(0) = D - K,
All people with lower income are homeless, even though
arbitrarily cheap housing is available. D is the density: the
measure of consumers per unit of quality.
We can now turn to comparative dynamics, and examine the
effects of changes in income distribution and interest rates on
rents and homelessness in the cheap construction case.
First consider a change in income distribution: income
inequality increases because the density in the middle of the
distribution goes down and the density at the two extremes goes
up. Holding the price schedule constant, such a change, as we
have argued in section 1, increases homelessness by increasing
the population with incomes below Y(0).
What happens to the price schedule and to Y(0)? We can
distinguish between two cases.
First suppose that q! is fairly low and the change in income
distribution increases the income density at every income not
exceeding Y(q,) (and possibly some greater incomes) by the same
proportion a. In this case, the price schedule will stay the
same and so Y(0) will stay the same. Homelessness will increase,
as in section 2, simply because more people are poor. However,
the stock of low income housing will also increase — by the same
proportion a — for any definition of low-income housing.
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Propostition 21: Suppose the income density function
changes from fx ( ) to f2(.) where f2(y) = (l+ajf^y) for all
y ^ Y(q,). Then the equilibrium price schedule remains the
same and the density of housing at all qualities less than or
equal to qt increases.
Proof: The density of population at quality q is
y,(g)) lmli2
and so equilibrium requires that this expression be identical to
a constant; say D:
fi(Y(q))Y'(q) = Dlt i=l,2 (5)
for all q < q1# The constant D{ is determined by the three
boundary conditions, for each income distribution. Suppose
D2 = (l+cODj. Then any function Y(.) that satisfies (5) for
i=l does so also for i=2; and everywhere that D{ appears in the
boundary conditions it can be replaced by (l+aJD^ The solution
for price stays the same, but density increases.
Q.E.D.
The second kind of increasing income inequality is more
difficult. Suppose the income distribution changes below yCq^ ;
relatively fewer people have incomes close to Y ^ ) and
relatively more have incomes close to Y(0). Roughly speaking,
this change causes an excess demand for low qualities of housing
and an excess supply of higher qualities (near qx) . Prices at
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and an excess supply of higher qualities (near q^ . Prices at
the bottom increase and prices at the top decrease. The former
effect increases p'(0) and hence increases Y(0) and homelessness;
the latter effect increases p'(q^ , if q! stays the same. Higher
P' (<3i) means that the tangent indifference curve at qt will be
steeper and so it will cut above the rc(q)+m curve; hence
equilibrium requires a smaller q{. The effect of smaller ql on
the price schedule and homelessness is ambiguous.
These effects can be illustrated in a small example with the
semilog utility function. Suppose pdf of income in the relevant
range is a step function:
f(y) = 1 y < y'
= A > i y > y*
where y* stays in the range from Y(0) to Y(qx) throughout the
analysis. Since we are discussing only the bottom of the income
distribution, there is no need to normalize. Then Y(q) must
satisfy
Y'(q) = D if Y(q) < y*
= D/A if Y(q) > y*
and so the price function must be of the form
p(gr) = Dq-K^il-e-")
= ^ q + K2-K2(l-e-«) q> Q
where D and the K's are constants that must be determined from
boundary conditions, and
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Q = ±[y*- (D-KX)]
is the quality corresponding to income y*. Since D - Kt = Y(0)
and by hypothesis y* > Y(0), Q is positive.
There are two added constants to determine, but the need to
keep both p(.) and p'(.) continuous at Q imposes two more
boundary conditions. (A discontinuity in either p(.) or p'(.)
would cause demand to vanish somewhere near Q, and the equal
demand equilibrium condition would be violated.)
These two continuity conditions are
which imply
and so
P (q) = — iq+
Note that the coefficient of D is unambiguously positive.
Now suppose A decreases: the proportion of people with
incomes above y* decreases. Since we are dealing only with low
incomes, such a change is an increase in inequality. If D and
stayed the same, the coefficient of D in (6) increases, and so
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the equilibrium condition p(q{) = R(qi) would be violated. So D
and Kt must change in such a manner to reduce pCq^ . Either D
must decrease or l^  must increase or, in general, both. Since
Y(0) = D-Kj, Y(0) and homelessness must increase. Q falls
because of the increase in homelessness, but from the changes in
D and K^ all prices below the new Q must rise. To keep value
constant, prices above Q must fall, and so p' (qx) must rise.
Since D falls (in general), the supply of housing below any
given quality falls also. Coupled with the rise in price for
qualities below Q, this means that low-income housing as defined
by price falls for two reasons. Rates of new construction and
abandonment must also fall, because D is the rate at which both
happen.
Thus a reduction in the size of the "lower middle class" has
much to commend it as an explanation for the '80s housing market
phenomena in northeastern and midwestern U.S. cities. The
intuition is fairly simple: housing for the poor is a by-product
of housing for the "lower middle class". A reduction in demand
by the "lower middle class" is a supply shock for the poor.
Next, consider what happens when the interest rate rises.
The cheap-maintenance results do not carry over to the cheap-
construction case; with cheap-construction, higher interest rates
do not ambiguously cause higher homelessness, although they might
do so. Higher interest rates have two effects that work in
opposite directions. Hold qx constant. First, higher interest
makes pCqJ = RCqJ higher. Since cCqJ stays the same and so
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v(qj) must stay the same, this change would decrease the price of
the lowest qualities and decrease homelessness if future prices
continued to be discounted the same way. The second effect is
the change in the discount rate that makes future prices less
valuable. Acting alone without a change in pCq^ , this would
increase all prices and drive up homelessness. In general, it is
impossible to say which effect will be stronger and how
homelessness will respond. (A rise in interest will almost
certainly increase qt as well, since it will increase the
distance from RCqJ to the (rc(.)+m) curve; but an increase in q!
has ambiguous effects on homelessness.)
The first effect will be stronger when the percentage
increase in p(qx) is large relative to the percentage decrease in





the percentage rate at which construction cost is increasing.
Construction cost parameters have no effect on the percentage
change in discounted value. Thus interest rate changes are
likely to increase homelessness when y is large or when r is
large to begin with.
In the semilog example with a uniform income distribution,
one other result is fairly immdediate. Since
Y(0) = p'(0) = D - K,,
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we can rewrite price as
p(q) =
where the coefficients of both Y(0) and D are positive. Since
higher interest rates make pCqJ = R(qi) higher, either Y(0) or
D must increase. So if homelessness doesn't increase, density
must.
4. EXTENSIONS
In this section, I will examine, once again by comparing
steady states, several extensions of the basic model developed in
the last section. First I will look at how the model changes
when a house's owner must incur some cost every period the house
is occupied, regardless of whether it is maintained or not. Then
the effects of building codes will be studied. Finally, I will
say a few words about public housing and vouchers; and relate the
model here to the rest of the filtering literature.
Rent collection cost
In the preceding section, I assumed that an owner who
decided not to maintain a house could continue to collect rents
without incurring any other costs whatsoever. There are,
however, at least five other types of cost that an owner who was
not maintaining a house would have to incur as long as she
continued to collect rent:
1. Rent collection costs. Somebody has to bill tenants,
keep track of whether they pay, and take action when they don't.
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For SRO's and similar very low-income housing, these transactions
costs are nontrivial.
2. Utility costs. Owners are often legally required to
provide heat and sanitary facilities. While in some sense these
costs might be considered maintenance (without heat, for
instance, pipes will burst; without sanitary facilities, hallways
will become noisome), both common language use and the law see
them as "operating" expenses, rather than investments.
3. Liability costs. Owners are liable for certain
injuries that occur on their property. Many purchase insurance
to cover this liability; others absorb it as a cost of doing
business. However they respond, liability is still a cost to the
owner. Moreover the owner or his property may also sustain
damage while the property is being rented.
4. Real estate taxes. Technically, in most localities
owners must pay real estate taxes whether or not their properties
are inhabited. However, because real estate taxes are usually
assessed in rem rather than in personam (Rubin [1936]; O'Flaherty
[1990]) an owner abandoning a building could (and would) caese
paying them. (White [1986] shows that taxpaying will cease
before rent collecting, but we will ignore this possibility in
this paper.)
5. Opportunity costs. The land a house stands on could be
used for some alternative purpose. An owner who continues to
rent a house every year incurs an opportunity cost equal to the
annuitized value of the resale price (see Brueckner [1981]).
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Gentrification stories about homelessness are essentially stories
about increases in opportunity costs.
Since all five of these costs must be incurred in any period
in which rent is collected. I will refer to their sum as rent
collection cost, in a slight abuse of terminology.
Let H denote rent collection cost per unit time. For
q > q*, H will simply have to be added to the equilibrium price
p(q) = rc(q) + m + H q > q*
and
v(q) = c(q).
Since maintaining still costs m per unit time and still saves
c'(.) in value, q* is still the right dividing line.
Consider the cheap maintenance case first. Rent collection
costs simply shift the price schedule up by H; the value schedule
remains
vm(q) = p(q') + mq
Owners are still indifferent about maintaining because the loss
in value is still m; vm(.) still approaches a positive quantity
as quality approaches zero.
The upward translation of the price schedule, of course,
means greater homelessness and a higher lowest quality of housing
on the market. Higher rent collection costs increase
homelessness and decrease low-income housing in several
dimensions.
The cheap construction case is more complicated, of course.
The lowest price will have to be H, not zero, and the lowest
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quality of housing on the market will have to be some q0 > 0 (if
e quality housing had a positive price like H, demand for it
would be zero, but supply would be positive), consumers at q0
must be indifferent between homelessness and q0 housing at price
H (if they strictly preferred q0, people with slightly less
income would also prefer q0 to homelessness, and too many people
would locate at q0 for the equal demand condition to be met; if
they strictly preferred homelessness, they would not locate at
q0). The equal demand condition implies too, that these
consumers must be the ones who would "normally" occupy these
houses if H were not lowest price possible. These considerations
lead to two equations
u(y(0) -H,qQ) = u(Y(O) ,0) (7)
-p/(go)ux(Y(0)-Htqo)+uq(Y{0) -H,qQ) = 0, (8)
where p'(q0) should be understood as a right-hand derivative.
For each q0 and H there is a unique p' (q0) that solves these
two equations; Y(0) can be eliminated. In the semilog utility
example, the relationship is
so that increases in H and decreases in q0 increase the required
P' (<3o) • (Both these changes increase the average slope of the
indiferrence curve linking (0,0) and (qo,H) , and so the slope at
q0 — which must be p' (q0) — is likely to increase.) Since
Y(0) = p(q0) + p'(q0) = H + p' (q0)
increases in H increase homelessness-if q0 stays the same; so do
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increases in p' (q0) if H stays the same.
Given qx and q0/ the price schedule is determined by two
price-matching conditions (p(qo)=H, p(qi)=R(qi)) and the value-
matching condition (v(q1)=c(q1) ) . These in turn determine
P' (<3o) / an(* equilibrium requires q0 be chosen to equate the p' (q0)
derived from these conditions to the p' (q0) derived from (7) and
(8).
Usually the relationship between q0 and the p'(q0) derived
from the price- and value-matching conditions will be positive,
but not always so. In the semilog utility example with a unifrom
distribution of income, these conditions boil down to
r) = D(g-(l-e-9))+p/(q0) [1-e"*) (10)
x) = [9[D(s-(l-e-s))]+p/(q0) [l-e'3] ] e-I(^s)ds (11)
Jo
where g = q! - q0 and H has disppeared. Increasing q0 gives the
price schedule less room in which to rise to meet R ^ ) ; it also
gives it less room in which to accumulate c(qx) in value. Either
D or p'(q0) must increase, and for most examples both will; but
as with interest rates, some unusual examples can be constructed
where D increases enough that p' (q0) must fall.
As ususal, these changes will trigger changes in qlf but the
changes in q, will have ambiguous effects on the variables we are
interested in.
Except in these unusual examples, then, an increase in H
will shift (9) upward, and this in turn will raise the
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equilibrium q0. Homelessness and Y(0) will rise as both H and
P'(go) increase. The rise in homelessness will be accompanied by
a disappearance of the lowest qualities of housing, and, usually,
by an increase in the supply of the remaining low-income housing.
Moreover, when H is positive, the same disappearance of the
lowest qualities of housing can also result from the kinds of
shocks that simply increased homelessness when H was zero. With
positive H, a reduction in the size of the lower middle class or
an increase in interest rates can eliminate the bottom qualities
of housing from the market.
Building codes
The same sort of analysis can easily be extended to consider
the effect of a legal prohibition of housinf below some quality
Q > 0. The cheap maintenance case is trivial: if the quality
constraint is high enough to be binding it raises homelessness
and eliminates qualities of housing; otherwise it does nothing.
In the cheap construction case, equations (7), (8), and (9)
still hold, but with H (i.e., p(Q)) considered endogenous and Q
considered exogenous. No major change is required in the price-
and value-matching conditions. If slopes are as described in the
last section, an increase in Q raises p(Q), p'(Q), and D, and
Y(0), and so increases homelessness.
There is, however, an important difference. If the
constraint on Q is binding, then changes in income distribution
and interest rates, holding Q constant, will not cause the
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elimination of low qualities of housing. Prices and homelessness
will increase, but the same housing qualitites will continue to
be available.
My preliminary analysis does not reveal any major building
code changes during the late '70s and early '80s, but there is
some evidence of the virtual elimination of certain qualities of
low income housing, like flophouses's. If true, these two facts
would indicate that rent collection costs rather than building
codes are the binding constraint on the bottom quality of housing
in the market. (This conclusion also accords with the
observations I have heard from businessmen in the low income
housing market.) Such a finding, however, does not absolve local
government policy from any responsibility for the rise of
homelessness, since most of components of rent collection cost
depend heavily on local government actions.
Public housing and housing vouchers
These traditional housing policies work by changing demand
from different parts of the income distribution. In the cheap-
maintenance case, they decrease homelessness precisely to the
extent that they house exactly the people who would have been
homeless in their absence; they do not affect the price schedule.
In the cheap-construction case, their impact on homelessness is
extremely sensitive to the exact demands that are augmented or
reduced.
Take, for instance, a public housing program. Suppose that
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it is aimed towards the lower middle class (this may not be a bad
description of public housing in New York City). If the
government supplies housing to this group, it reduces demand for
housing at the top of the filtering section around q. The result
— an increase in homelessness— is precisely the same as that of
a reduction in the size of the lower middle class. On the other
hand, a public housing program aimed at people not much richer
than Y(0) (probably a good description of public housing in
Newark and Chicago), will reduce demand at the bottom of the
quality distribution, and this in turn will reduce homelessness.
(That public housing grew in New York in the '70s, and '80s, and
shrank in Newark and Chicago is thus entirely consistent with the
growth of homelessness in all three cities.)
Vouchers effectively move people from one "income" to
another, and so a voucher program affects demand at two
qualities, at least. The possibilities grow. A voucher program
that moved people from homelessness or very near it to very near
qlt would clearly decrease homelessness; a program that moved
people from near qt to over q2 would increase homelessness; and a
program that just shuffled people around near qx would do almost
nothing. The initial income distribution can matter here, too,
since a voucher program could be relieving or exacerbating a
bottleneck in the flow of houses downward to abandonment.
Administration of voucher programs also matters. The section 8
program places maintenance requirements on units being paid for
with vouchers. Maintenance requirements would do more than shift
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demand.
Relation with other literature
Since Sweeney [1974] first rigorously developed and solved a
model of filtering in the housing market, many writers have used
models like the one in this paper. Arnott [1987, pp. 971-981]
provides an excellent survey of many of these papers.
The original Sweeney paper is probably closest to the work
here in that it models both supply and demand. However, there is
no explicit provision for homelessness, the maintenance
technology dooms every house to deteriorate eventually, and
quality is a discrete variable rather than a continuous one.
Discrete quality makes it difficult to investigate seriously how
the lowest quality of housing in the market is determined — too
much depends on step size.
Braid [1981, 1984] studies a continuum of qualities, but
focuses on the demand side. He also rules out homelessness
explicitly. Henderson [1977] and Arnott, Davidson, and Pines
[1983] look at continuous qualities, but they concentrate on the
supply side, maintenance decisions especially. Since
homelessness is a demand side phenomenon, supply side models can
at best give hints about reasons for homelessness.
Arnott, Braid, Davidson and Pines[1986] integrate supply and
demand, with continuous qualities, but assume that all consumers
have the same income. Once again, interesting homelessness is
impossible to study in this model.
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Both Arnott, Davidson, and Pines and 0'Flaherty [1993]
explicitly consider the possibility of rebuilding, which this
paper ignores except in the calculation of rent collection costs.
Private rebuilding on land where buildings have been abandoned
has been quite rare in the US cities — my 1993 paper tries to
answer why — and it seems easier to ignore the phenomenon
altogether here rather than construct an elaborate model in which
it would end up not happening.
My 1993 paper also differs from this work in incorporating
uncertainty. The important lesson from uncertainty is that in
the 197 0s, homelessness may have been "artifically" low relative
to fundamentals. In that paper, houses deteriorate until they
are rebuilt; the lowest quality on the market depends on the
opportunity cost of rebuilding. Uncertainty introduces an option
value for low quality housing; as long as the option is not
exercised by rebuilding, the owner can wait for a more profitable
time to rebuild. During bad times, this option value drives down
the lowest quality available in the market: owners are waiting
for good times to return. In this model, homelessness rises when
good times return, owners exercise their rebuilding options, and
low qualities of housing disappear from the market. This sort of
model may explain part of the explosiveness of the rise of
homelessness in many American cities, and part of the American
association between homelessness and prosperity.
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5. SHELTERS
When the government and concerned citizens find people
sleeping on the streets, they usually set up shelters (or
hostels, in the British and Canadian usage). Because shelter
beds are reasonably easy to count, while people sleeping on the
street are almost impossible, numerical studies of homelessness
are almost always studies of shelters. This can lead to some
biases: for instance, wealthier cities with more valuable real
estate might be expected to establish more shelters simply
because charity and unobstructed streets are both normal goods,
and the presence of homeless people causes larger absolute
reductions in the value of more expensive property.
The most important question about shelters is whether and
how they affect people who would not be homeless if shelters did
not exist. That government and charitable activities alter
behavior is, of course, no reason to condemn them: the provision
of tap water clearly lowers the demand for bottled water, and
most users of tap water would shift to bottled water rather than
die of thirst if the city went out of the water business. But
still, for understanding changes in the number of people staying
in shelters we need to know the effect of shelters.
In this section, therefore, we will look first at how
shelter provision alters equilibrium conditions in the housing
market model we have been working with, and then we will look at
shelter provision when people differ in both tastes and income.
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Finally we will endogenize shelter provision and show how
hysteresis alters the time profile of measured homelessness.
Homogeneous tastes
Incorporating shelters into the housing market model of the
last two sections is fairly easy; it just involves shifting the
"zero" on the demand side. Let government or charities provide
shelters of quality S > 0 for free to anyone who wishes to use
them. While "right to shelter" is far from a universal legal
doctrine, rationing of shelter beds does not seem to be a
widespread phenomenon. At various times in various cities,
people have been turned away from shelters, but in most cities at
most times shelters have vacancies. Capacity is usually not a
binding constraint, especially for a city's shelter system as a
whole.
In the cheap-maintenance case, shelters must cause some low
qualities of housing to disappear, and the former residents of
that housing to enter shelters, as long as a building code
constraint is not binding. This happens even if S is below the
quality of any housing on the market when shelters are
introduced. The previous lowest quality on the market made its
consumers indifferent between homelessness and buying that
quality at the supply price. If shelters are available at the
same price as street homelessness but are more attractive, then
the lowest quality of housing available in the market has a
higher hurdle to surpass. The lowest quality of housing rises
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faster than the quality of shelters S rises, because the price
schedule is upward-sloping.
For example, with semilog utility, Y(0) and qm, the minimum
quality on the market, are determined jointly by
In [Y(0) -pa(qm)] +gm = In 7(0) +5
which makes the Y(0)-indifference curve through (S,0) tangent to
the price-schedule at qm. These imply
rm(eq"-s-l) = pm{qm)
An equal change in qm and S leaves the left-hand side of this
expression unchanged, but increases the right-hand side (which
does not depend on S). So qm must rise still more in order for
equilibrium to be restored.
With cheap construction and rent collection costs the
picture is much the same, although there is the further
possibility of an increase in p'(q0) , which would increase
homelessness further. With no rent collection costs, shelters at
quality S will necessarily eliminate demand for all housing below
S, and if p'(s) is greater the p'(0) (because the horizon for
price-rise and value recoupment is shorter), shelter residency
will be greater than homelessness for this reason as well.
Thus unless a building code constraint is binding, shelters
will always contain people who would not have been homeless if
shelters were not there. To the extent that shelters are
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established for eleemosynary purposes this result is not
necessarily to be decried. If S is low the people who enter
shelters would have been very badly off even if they were housed.
Since (almost) everyone who enters a shelter becomes better off
by doing so, shelters may still be helping a deserving class. To
the extent that shelters are established for street cleaning
purposes, however, the extra people are a burden.
At its root, contamination is a moral hazard problem. If
income could be observed costlessly, there would be no need for
shelters: those with income below Y(0) could be paid the
difference between their income and Y(0) (or a greater amount if
higher quality housing were deemed desirable). Income, however,
as we are using it here, is an abstraction for resources, and
resources at the bottom of the social scale (as at the top) are
essentially unobservable. Good family connections, for instance,
are a key resource for the very poor, and they cannot be easily
and verifiably observed. Most shelters do not have income
eligibility requirements; they rely on self selection. A cash
distribution scheme could not rely on self selection.
The emergence of bigger and better and better-publicized
shelters during the 1980's is therefore one more reason why
measured homelessness grew; it seems likely to have contributed
especially to the explosive nature of that growth. To say this
is not to argue that homelessness exists just because a bunch of
soft-hearted and weak-minded liberals set up shelters. There are
enough other reasons for homelessness to have risen in the United
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States in the 1980's. It is to assert, rather, that certain
intermediate levels of homelessness are unlikely to be observed
in equilibrium.
Tooth decay is a good analogy. In the presence of dentists,
small cavities do not persist in equilibrium. Dentists drill
them and make them big in order to put fillings in. Dentists
don't cause cavities, but the way they treat them makes them
bigger. Whether or not this treatment method is optimal is a
separate issue from what it does to the size of cavities;
dentists seem to think their method is pretty good.
Heterogeneous tastes
Heterogeneous tastes make moral hazard problems bigger
because they add another unobservable. There is good reason to
believe tastes are heterogeneous: some people sleep on the
streets even when shelters have vacancies. Thus even if shelter
operators could observe income perfectly and restrict admission
to people below some income level, they still could not restrict
their shelters only to those who would otherwise be on the
street. The same is true for cash assistance.
When the homeless have heterogeneous tastes, the quality of
shelter S becomes a more interesting variable for shelter
operators who are motivated primarily by street-cleaning
concerns. With homogeneous tastes, such operators would set S as
low as possible, and could still be assured that no one would
stay on the street. With heterogeneous tastes, this strategy
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won't work; very few street people would be encouraged inside
unless the shelter quality was pretty good, and if the shelter
quality was pretty good, many people who would not think of
living on the streets would come to the shelter. Depending on
the distribution of tastes and the cost of shelter, it is
conceivable that street-cleaning shelters could have higher
quality than eleemosynary shelters.
Hysteresis
While most of this paper has been concerned with comparative
steady states, some problems of adjustment also deserve mention.
The main one is hysteresis. Decreasing homelessness is much more
difficult than increasing it.
On the level of the individual homeless person, hysteresis
works in several different ways. There are fixed costs both to
entering homelessness and to leaving it. Entering homelessness
may involve loss of possessions, an investment in "learning the
ropes" and in community [see e.g., for a discussion of the
Manhattan Bridge homeless community, Dordick[1993]]. It also
implies enhanced hazards of physical and mental illness. Leaving
homelessness requires search costs and often a deposit. The
conditions that are bad enough to make someone become homeless
are considerably worse than the conditions good enough to make
someone leave homelessness.
Individual-level hysteresis is compounded by shelter-level
hysteresis. Setting up a shelter has several obvious fixed
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costs—learning about homelessness and shelter operation,
searching for and renovating a building, getting licenses.
Another set up cost is the loss of information—once you set up a
shelter you no longer can tell how many people would be on the
street if the shelter weren't there. Shelters won't be shut down
just because conditions are as good as they were when the
shelters were set up.
Because of contamination, the two levels of hysteresis
compound each other. If homelessness has been high, more
shelters are open, more people occupy them, and more people stay
homeless—which in turn causes more shelters to stay open. Under




1. Rising inequality with fixed prices can explain rising
horaelessness, but cannot explain why housed poor people would pay
more for housing.
2. With filtering, rising inequality can also explain these
higher prices, as well as decreasing abandonment and a smaller
stock of low income housing.
3. Rising real interest rates can explain higher
homelessness, higher prices, and less-housing available below a
fixed rent, but have difficulty fully explaining the fall in
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abandonment.
4. A rise in rent collection costs, if it occurred, would
have many of the same effects as a rise in real interest rates.
So would a rise in building code standards.
5. If a rent collection cost constraint is binding in
determining the lowest quality of housing available, increases in
inequality or in real interest rates will eliminate some
qualities of housing from the market. This will not happen if a
building code constraint is binding.
6. The impact of traditional housing programs is very
sensitive to the exact place on the income distribution where
they operate.
7. Unless a building code constraint is binding, shelters
will always serve some people who would not otherwise be on the
street and will always cause the loss of some qualities of
housing. If consumers have heterogeneous tastes, this conclusion
is even stronger and will hold even if a building code constraint
is binding.
8. Homelessness is marked by hysteresis. Once homelessness
has gone up, external conditions have to become considerably
better than they were originally for homelessness to return to
where it was originally.
Understanding homelessness is thus a task well within the
capabilities of current economic analysis. Figuring out what to
do about homelessness is harder.
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